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7.1  Introduction 
One of  the key elements of the approach to the debt problem that 
has dominated official thinking since 1982 has been an effort to mobilize 
private flows of capital to countries with debt-servicing problems. The 
interest payments on LDC debt, it has been widely accepted, are more 
than the debtors can or, at any rate, will pay out of current export 
income. This gap between feasible resource transfer and interest due 
must be filled in some way. It could be filled by  official lending, but 
this is an unlikely and probably undesirable prospect. It could also be 
filled by  large-scale debt forgiveness, but the whole point of the US- 
IMF strategy has been to avoid forcing such drastic action. What re- 
mains is private capital flows. Bank lending was expected to provide 
most of  the capital flow under the debt strategy as it first emerged in 
1983, and it was supposed to play a major role under the Baker initiative 
of  1985. 
Yet in fact private capital flows to problem debtors have consistently 
fallen far short of expectations. Even in  1983-84, the banner years of 
“concerted lending,” much of  the funding that came in the front door 
was lost through the back door.  In the following two years, private 
capital flows to problem debtors were minor, despite a few highly visible 
injections of  new  money. To  a first approximation, the debtors have 
made resource transfers equal to interest less official inflows. Since 
official inflows themselves have been fairly small, the end result has 
been that debtors have been forced to run massive trade surpluses. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to reexamine the prospects for private 
capital flows to problem debtors. The central question is whether it is 
possible to induce sufficient capital inflows to aid substantially in  the 
servicing of debt. To analyze this it necessary to ask, in particular, why 
efforts to mobilize private capital to date have been so disappointing. 
Thus the chapter focuses on the reasons for the stalling of the process 
of concerted lending after 1984 as a key  test of the possibilities  for 
inducing capital flows. 
The chapter is divided as  follows. Section 7.2 examines the rationale 
for private capital flows to countries that are already in debt trouble: 
Why should we ever expect to see new money provided to a country 
whose  servicing of  existing debt is  in question? Section 7.3 reviews 
the experience with  private capital  flows  since  1982, and  examines 
alternative explanations of the failure of these flows to materialize on 
the scale that was originally envisaged. Section 7.4 examines the fea- 
sibility and desirability of attracting private capital through channels 
other than bank lending, notably through direct foreign investment or 
the currently popular option of debt-equity swaps. Finally, section 7.5 
attempts to assess the prospects for generating private capital inflows 
in the future. 
7.2  The Theory of Defensive Lending 
To  a man from Mars, or The Wall Street Journal, the proposition 
that new lending is essential to deal with the debt crisis seems extremely 
strange-a  proposal to throw good money after bad. Yet private capital 
inflow has been a centerpiece of the official strategy for dealing with 
the debt crisis (although not of its execution-see  section 7.3 below). 
To understand why this may be a good idea, it is necessary to appreciate 
two key points: the possibility that a country may have growing debt 
yet be growing more creditworthy over time, and the possibility  that 
lending at a loss may be in the interest of the creditors if  it defends the 
value of existing claims. On the other side, the problems that may block 
desirable capital inflow must be noted, as well as the potential role of 
official agencies in promoting such inflow. 
7.2.1  The Analytics of Debt Growth and Creditworthiness 
At the heart of the orthodox analysis of the debt problem, as rep- 
resented for example by Cline (1983) and Feldstein (1986), is the an- 
alytical point that a country can simultaneously be increasing its debt 
and steadily improving its debt position as measured by such indicators 
as the ratio of debt to GNP or to export. The key point is that the debt 
indicators  are ratios, whose denominators can be expected to grow 
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creditworthiness steadily improves, as long as it grows more slowly 
than GNP or exports-the  denominator. 
Consider the following numerical example, drawn from Feldstein et 
al. (1987). A country has a GNP of $200 billion, and an external debt 
of $100 billion  (slightly above the average debt to GNP ratio for the 
IMF’s category of “fifteen  heavily  indebted countries”). It must pay 
an interest rate of 9 percent on the debt. The world inflation rate is 4 
percent, and the country’s real GNP is expected to grow at an annual 
rate of 3 percent. 
If the country were obliged to pay all interest out of current income 
then even if  all principal were rescheduled it would be obliged to run 
a surplus on noninterest current account of $9 billion, or 4.5 percent 
of GNP. While such a surplus is not impossible to run, it is sufficiently 
large to impose substantial strains on the economic and political situ- 
ation  in  debtor countries. A  sustained resource transfer at this rate 
would raise risks that “debtor fatigue”  will lead to increasing unwill- 
ingness of the debtor to pay. Thus some reduction in the size of  the 
resource transfer is crucial. 
Suppose, however,  that the country is able to attract $4 billion  of 
new money. Then it will need to run a noninterest surplus of only $5 
billion, or 2.5 percent of GNP-a  more tolerable number. It might at 
first  seem that this simply  puts the country even deeper into debt, 
which in a literal sense it does, since the debt grows by 4  percent. The 
country’s real GNP, however, we have assumed will grow at 3 percent, 
which together with the price increase of 4  percent will imply a 7 percent 
growth in money GNP. Thus the ratio of debt to GNP  will fall, and the 
country will be in a more favorable position, not a less favorable one, 
at the start of the next year. 
In fact, if  the country were merely seeking to stabilize its ratio of 
debt to GNP, it could borrow $7 billion, and make net payments of 
only $2 billion,  or  1  percent of GNP. If  it were able to borrow this 
much, and willing to devote 1 percent of GNP  to net interest payments 
indefinitely, it could honor all its debt commitments. If the real interest 
rate were lower,  or the growth  rate higher,  the necessary resource 
transfer would be even smaller. Calculations of this kind underlay the 
optimism of  many economists about the debt of LDCs in the 1970s, 
and continue to be the basis of optimistic assessments now (again see 
Feldstein 1986). 
If  coping with debt seems relatively easy even given realistic levels 
of indebtedness, historically  high real interest rates, and an assumed 
growth rate that is low by past standards, why is there a debt problem? 
The immediate  answer is  that the new  money  that in  our example 
reduces the interest burden to an easily tolerable level has not been 
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is essentially the definition of a problem debtor), nor indeed have they 
provided much new money even under duress. This observation, how- 
ever, only leads to the next question: Why does this favorable algebra 
not convince lenders to be willing to lend? 
The main answer seems to be  that while a modest annual rate of 
resource transfer to creditors will  suffice to honor the debts even of 
countries that have high ratios of debt to GNP, this will only be the 
case if the resource transfer is very sustained. In the example we have 
just given-debt  equal to half of GNP, growth at 3 percent, and a real 
interest rate of 5 percent-resource  transfer at the rate of 2.5 percent 
of GNP would have to continue for 25 years to work off all the debt. 
If  “debtor fatigue”  were to set in before that, preventing further re- 
source transfer,  the debt would  be  worth less than  par,  even if  the 
country were willing to run surpluses for quite a while. For example, 
even 10 years of resource transfer would  provide a present value of 
resource transfer equal to only 45 percent of the value of the debt. 
Doubt over whether debtors will be willing to run the trade surpluses 
needed to honor their debts for the very extended periods thus envis- 
aged underlies the unwillingness of banks or other lenders to provide 
new money to the problem debtors. However, there remains a case for 
new lending by existing creditors to defend the value of their claims. 
This  case for “involuntary,”  or perhaps more accurately,  defensive 
lending, underlies the concept and rhetoric of the US-IMF debt strategy. 
7.2.2  The Case for Defensive Lending 
When a country’s willingness to service its debts in full is uncertain, 
a potential lender with no existing stake in the country could be induced 
to lend only by being offered a high interest rate, which itself would 
provide an incentive for future nonpayment. Thus, in the case of prob- 
lem debtors, new lending from the markets has dried  up. Creditors 
may have an incentive to relend part of their interest due, however, as 
a way of  protecting  the value of the loans they  have  already  made. 
This incentive forms the basis of the hopes for inducing bank lending 
to problem debtors. 
When does it make sense to lend more money to a country already 
having trouble servicing its debt? The issue is often framed as one of 
liquidity versus solvency: The country is illiquid, that is, short of cash 
to pay its debt service, but it is solvent, that is, given time it will be 
able and (more important) willing to make  resource transfers to its 
creditors equal  in  present value  to its debt. However, it  is  quickly 
apparent upon reflection  that this cannot be quite right; if  a country 
were known to be merely illiquid, not insolvent, it would be able to 
attract voluntary lending to deal with its liquidity problem. It is only 
the possibility of a solvency problem that creates the liquidity problem. 303  Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors 
The right way to think about the situation, as stressed by Cline (1983), 
Krugman (1985), and Sachs (1984), is as one of uncertainty in which 
defensive  lending by  existing creditors buys  an option to collect on 
their claims in the future if  the situation improves. Suppose that it is 
fairly likely that a country will fail to pay its debt in full even if  it is 
able to avoid an immediate crisis; but that it is virtually certain that 
the country will  repudiate an important part of  its obligation  if  its 
creditors attempt to collect full interest immediately. Then new lending 
that reduces the interest burden, although a losing proposition in iso- 
lation, may be worthwhile because it improves the expected value of 
the initial debt. 
Even under quite adverse circumstances this defensive lending ar- 
gument can justify quite substantial increases in creditor exposure. To 
see why, consider the basic algebra of the situation. Let D be a coun- 
try's outstanding debt, and d be the subjective discount that creditors 
place on that debt (which may be inferred from the secondary market 
price if  that market  is sufficiently well  developed). Suppose that by 
relending part of the interest, and thus averting an immediate liquidity 
crisis, creditors can reduce the discount to some smaller amount, d'. 
Such a program will have a cost-the  expected loss on the new lend- 
ing-and  a benefit-the  increase in the value of existing claims. The 
cost will be d'L, where L is the value of new lending; while the benefit 
will be (d - d')D. Thus a program of defensive lending will be worth 
undertaking as long as 
d'L < (d - d')D, 
or 
LID < (d - d7id'. 
Now suppose that in the absence of a program of defensive lending 
the discount on claims would be 50 percent, while even with  such a 
program the discount would be reduced only to 40 percent. Even with 
these fairly dismal numbers, it would be worthwhile for creditors to 
expand their exposure by 25 percent to protect their original investment. 
The orthodox view of the debt problem, as exposited most famously 
by Cline (1983), was that this incentive for defensive lending could be 
used to mobilize new bank lending on a sufficient scale that, combined 
with  adjustment efforts by  the countries and an improving external 
environment, problem debtors could be returned to normal capital mar- 
ket access after a few years. It was recognized from the beginning, 
however, that there were serious obstacles to mobilization of capital 
flows from existing creditors; these obstacles now look more serious 
than was realized  in  1983. 304  Paul Krugman 
7.2.3  Obstacles to Defensive Lending: The Free-Rider Problem 
The first obstacle to a program of defensive lending was immediately 
noted by many observers: There is a free-rider problem. The collective 
defensive lending of existing creditors raises the expected value of their 
collective claims, but for any individual creditor it would be preferable 
to opt out. In effect, the call for defensive lending from creditors asks 
that lenders, whom we  suppose act competitively  under normal cir- 
cumstances, suddenly begin  to act collusively  once the country is in 
debt trouble. 
Cline (1983) offered a convenient formulation of this issue, by sup- 
posing that the creditors consist of a collusive core and a competitive 
fringe. Defensive lending is undertaken only by the core that owns a 
fraction,  of the outstanding claims. Assuming that it is possible to 
arrange for complete rescheduling of the principal of the fringe (which 
is a little optimistic; see section 7.3 below) the criterion for defensive 
lending now becomes 
LID = f(d - d')ld' 
That is, the smaller the collusive core the less defensive lending will 
be worth undertaking. 
In 1983 the hope was that this free-rider problem could be overcome 
through  a variety of  ad hoc means. First, while international  capital 
markets may be highly competitive  ex ante, the claims on any individual 
country are much more concentrated ex post. Second, most  lending 
took the form of syndicated  loans in  which  a certain amount of co- 
operative behavior was already built in. Third, the form of negotiations 
between a country and its creditors, in which an advisory committee 
represents the banks, itself tends to foster cooperative behavior among 
the creditors. Fourth, informal pressure from the central banks of cred- 
itors countries could be brought  to bear on  the smaller commercial 
banks to go along with collective lending packages. Fifth, official lend- 
ing could reduce the extent of defensive lending required to an extent 
that would make the necessary cooperative behavior more feasible. 
Does the limited extent of lending since 1984 show that these ad hoc 
means of overcoming the free-rider problem were inadequate? Before 
jumping to this conclusion, we need to recognize that free riding is not 
the only potential obstacle to defensive lending. 
7.2.4  Obstacles to Defensive Lending: Bargaining and Conflict 
To  the extent that creditors are able to overcome their free-rider 
problems and act as a unit, they next find themselves in a situation of 
bilateral  monopoly  vis-a-vis the debtor country. There is  a range of 
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to the country and the maximum acceptable to the banks. For the banks, 
any defensive lending that is less than the interest payments on existing 
debt-that  is, any program that leads to a positive resource transfer 
from the country-is  better than no payment at all. From the point of 
view of the country, there is a range of rates of resource transfer that 
is preferable  to failure to reach an agreement, which  would end the 
resource transfer but lead the banks to invoke penalties. 
In general, economic theory does not offer any determinate outcome 
to bilateral monopoly. However, a useful light is shed on bilateral mo- 
nopoly  by  recent developments in  bargaining  theory.  The literature 
started by Rubinstein (1982) and applied to international debt by Bulow 
and Rogoff (1986) envisages a situation in which bargaining parties are 
able to make alternating offers, which continue until one party accepts. 
Each party pays some price for waiting. Such bargaining games have 
a simple and elegant solution: The first offer is in fact set at a level 
that will be accepted, with the terms of that offer depending on both 
the threat points  of the players-the  minimum  settlement that each 
prefers to no agreement at all-and  the cost to each of waiting. 
While bargaining models are not easily applied to debt in a rigorous 
fashion, they suggest several useful points. First, it is a useful metaphor 
to think of capital flows from creditors to debtors as the outcome of a 
bargain. The determinants of that bargain  are not the degree of opti- 
mism about the debtor’s future, or the rewards for good behavior; they 
are the perceptions of each side about the level of welfare it can achieve 
without an agreement and the relative cost of delaying an agreement. 
Second, by focussing attention on the bargaining aspect of the pro- 
vision  of new money, we  are led to focus on the incentives for the 
parties to reach agreement. For the creditors the cost of failing to reach 
agreement is obvious-they  do not get paid. For the debtor, however, 
the costs are more  subtle and questionable: loss of future access to 
capital  markets? disruption  of  trade? sanctions by  creditor country 
governments? A key question in understanding  the limited extent of 
capital flows is to ask why the rather fuzzy costs of failure to reach 
agreement have nonetheless left the countries in  such an apparently 
weak bargaining position. 
Third, the bargaining approach is a useful way to begin thinking about 
the problem  of default.  As Bulow and Rogoff  have emphasized, the 
usual discussion,  in which  a country either pays or defaults, fails to 
capture the ongoing process of negotiation.  On one side, a debt re- 
structuring may considerably reduce the present value  of  debt obli- 
gations without any declarations of default or invocation of sanctions. 
On the other side, a country may fail to reach agreement with cred- 
itors, and be formally  in  default for a time, without  precluding the 
possibility  of  eventually  reaching  an  agreement. Thus rather  than 306  Paul Krugman 
posing the question whether the country will pay or not, we need to 
ask how much it will pay, on one side, and how long it will  take to 
reach agreement, on the other. 
In the simplest bargaining models agreement is always reached im- 
mediately, because the first offer is set at a level that is just acceptable. 
However, this result  depends on the parties having the same infor- 
mation. If one or both parties have private information-for  example, 
if  the country knows better than its creditors how costly it would be 
for it to go without an agreement, or the creditors are better informed 
about  the  consequences  for  them  of  having  to  declare  loans 
nonperforming-then  there is the possibility of a costly period of failure 
to reach agreement. The reason is that paying the costs of a temporary 
bargaining impasse may be the only way for either the debtor or the 
creditors to credibly establish bargaining strength. Brazil may feel that 
it is able to cope well with the consequences of not paying interest; if 
its creditors were convinced of this they would make concessions that 
would avert the need for Brazil to carry out its threat. A simple dec- 
laration of a tough posture, however, may not be enough; Brazil may 
need to go through a period of suffering the consequences of a debt 
moratorium to show that it really means it. 
This point of view suggests that a failure to reach agreement should 
be  viewed  as a normal  part of the bargaining  process rather than  a 
catastrophic event. It is not, however, necessarily appropriate for gov- 
ernments and official agencies to stand aside and allow the bargaining 
process to follow its bumpy  path. Like the costs incurred to signal 
desirable attributes in other areas of economics, the cost incurred by 
a failure to reach agreement represent a real social cost (e.g., through 
disruption of  trade, financial flows, political stability, etc.). It may be 
worthwhile for the Brazilians and their bankers to accept this cost in 
order to demonstrate their toughness, but  it  is  preferable  from the 
world’s point of view, and possibily from the point of view of the parties 
themselves, if  agreement can be reached more quickly. Thus there is 
a potential  albeit problematic  role for creditor country governments 
and multilateral  agencies as facilitators of agreement. 
7.2.5  The Contribution of Third Parties 
Official agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
U.S. Treasury, can act to facilitate bank lending to problem debtors in 
several ways. To  the extent that the free-rider problem is dominant, 
they  can use indirect pressure to induce lending by  reluctant  banks, 
especially small potential  free riders. They can also provide  enough 
additional lending to make a defensive lending program by a collusive 
core worthwhile in circumstances where defensive lending is actually 
in the creditors’ collective interest but not worthwhile for the collusive 
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The IMF and others can also enter into the bargaining process. Most 
benignly,  the third  party  could  simply  serve as a mediator,  making 
offers that serve as focal points for agreement. More problematically, 
it can use sticks and carrots to induce quicker agreement between the 
bargainers.  If IMF resources are made available as a significant con- 
tribution  to  the pot, but  only  contingent  on an agreement that also 
meets IMF terms, this provides an incentive for the players to forgo 
the costly  process of  signalling their  toughness and  to reach  quick 
agreement. If the U.S. government implies that it will  retaliate  eco- 
nomically or politically against a country that fails to reach agreement 
with its bankers, this is also an incentive to reach an agreement quickly. 
A bargaining perspective is again useful for examining this role. What 
it makes clear is that while an adroit intervention by third parties can 
facilitate the flow of private capital to a troubled debtor, a less adroit 
intervention can easily reduce that flow and perhaps even reduce the 
total capital flow to the country. Suppose,  for example, that the country 
and its creditors would have reached agreement quickly without the 
carrot of official money; then provision of official money will not avoid 
any social costs, while it will typically  be at least partly offset by a 
reduced supply of new money from the private creditors. (If the cred- 
itors make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the country, then they will reduce 
the offer by the full amount of the official resources contributed. More 
generally, in a bargaining  situation the country will get more but the 
banks will give less (see Bulow and Rogoff  1986). 
If  the third party threatens (or is perceived  to threaten) sanctions 
against the country if  agreement is not reached, this will make agree- 
ment take place more quickly,  but it will also reduce the bargaining 
strength of the debtor. Thus while the risk of disruption as a result of 
hard bargaining  goes down, so does the capital flow that eventually 
results. As I  will  argue below,  U.S. policy  may  well  have had  this 
perverse effect, especially for some of the smaller debtors. 
The point to be made is that the role of official agencies in a debt 
negotiation is, in economic terms, a second-best attempt to deal with 
a market failure. Like all second-best policies, its effect is sensitive to 
the details of the situation; a policy that does good in one case may 
do harm in an apparently similar case. 
7.3 
I  have now examined  the rationale for continued  bank lending to 
problem  debtors. The theory suggests that there is  an incentive for 
creditors to supply a continuing flow of funds, but that the process of 
lending may be hampered both by free-rider problems and by the efforts 
of parties to establish strength through bargaining.  I now turn to the 
experience of bank lending since 1982, and its implications. 
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7.3.1 
Table  7.1 presents  an overview of  the lending  of  banks from the 
opening of the debt strategy at the end of  1982 to the end of  1986. Here 
two aggregates of  debtor countries are considered: the IMF’s group of 
“fifteen heavily indebted countries,” and Latin America. The essential 
impression  conveyed by  the table is that the mobilization  of private 
capital flows to debtors that was a central element of the debt strategy 
took place to a very limited extent in 1983 and  1984 and basically not 
at all  since. Whether one looks at the broader aggregate  of problem 
debtors or the narrower aggregate of Latin America, one sees that since 
1982, and especially since 1984, debtor countries have run noninterest 
surpluses large enough to cover the bulk of  their interest due, with a 
small contribution from official sources and very little from private new 
money. Only in 1986 was there a move toward current account deficit, 
which  must have had capital  inflow  as its counterpart; more on this 
turn of events later. 
Admittedly, this aggregative picture is somewhat misleading, for two 
reasons. First, it conceals differences  among countries. While banks 
were on net withdrawing from some troubled but still relatively liquid 
debtors (e.g., Venezuela),  they were significantly expanding their ex- 
posure in others. Second, the flow of funds reveals disbursements, but 
it is at least equally important to look at commitments, especially given 
the role of “concerted” lending for defensive purposes. Tables 7.2 and 
7.3 provide some information  on these issues. 
The Magnitude of Bank lending 
Table 7.1  Indicators of  Bank Lending to Problem Debtors 
1982  1983  1984  1985  I986 
15 debtors 
Private debt  336.9  337.3  347.0  341.8  342.0 
(growth rate)  -  0. I  2.8  -  1.5  0. I 
Current account  -  50.6  -  15.2  -0.6  -0.1  -  11.8 
Resource transfer  -  12.8  21.0  38.3  37.4  21.1 
DebtiGDP  41.7  47.0  46.8  46.3  48.4 
Debtiexports  269.8  289.7  272.1  284.2  337.9 
Latin America 
Private debt  291.9  292.1  303.2  303.8  308.0 
Bank debt (growth)  6.1  3.1  -0.1  2.7  0.9 
Current account  -8.1  21.7  32.1  28.3  12.4 
DebtiGDP  42.9  47.3  47.6  46.8  48.5 
(growth rate)  -  0.0  3.8  0.2  1.4 
Resource transfer  -42.4  -  10.9  -  2.6  -4.7  -  16.1 
Debtiexports  273.8  290.3  277. I  295.5  354.7 
Sourcc,s: International Monetary Fund (1987) and UNCTAD (1987). 309  Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors 
Table 7.2  Bank Lending to Selected Countries ($ billion) 
1985  1986 
1983  1984  1985  1 st half  I st half 
15 Heavily indebted  11.1  5.4  -  1.9  -  1.2  -  3.4 
Argentina  2.3  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.1 
Brazil  5.2  5.2  -  2.9  -  1.0  -  1.0 
Korea  2.2  3.5  2.3  1.4  -0.2 
Mexico  2.8  1.2  0.7  0.1  -0.8 
Venezuela  -  1.3  -2.2  0.4  -0.1  -0.3 
countries 
Sourw: M.  Watson., R. Kincaid,  C. Atkinson,  E. Kalter, and  D.  Folkerts-Landau, 
Intemutional Capital Markets: Developments and  Prospects, International Monetary 
Fund. December 1986. 
Table 7.3  LDC Lending Commitments ($ billion) 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1984:l  1984:2  1985”  1986” 
All capital  47.0  42.6  32.6  29.9  16.1  17.6  12.3  13.2  18.7 
importers 
Latin America 
Total  25.2  23.0  15.3  15.4  2.5  11.4  4.0  2.4  7.9 
Spontaneous  25.2  23.0  2.0  0.6  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.2 
Concerted  13.3  14.8  2.4  11.1  3.7  2.3  7.7 
Source: See table 7.2. 
dFirst three quarters. 
Table 7.2  offers some more detailed information  on the financing of 
Latin nations. It shows that there was indeed more bank lending than 
the aggregates suggest, because in  the aggregates  the programs for 
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are masked by such events as the out- 
flow from Venezuela and (in the larger aggregate) Korea’s move toward 
current account surplus. For Argentina, Brazil,  and Mexico, private 
capital did make a significant though modest contribution in 1983, and 
1984 was not quite as bad as it seems in the aggregate.  Nonetheless, 
the essential failure of bank lending to make much contribution after 
1983 and especially  1984 remains apparent. 
Table 7.3 looks at commitments rather than disbursements. By this 
measure the difference between 1983 and 1984 is less clear-cut; rather, 
the limited  process of  concerted lending seems to have run aground 
only in the second half of  1984. The table essentially reflects the con- 
clusion of Brazilian and Mexican new-money packages in January and 
April  of  1984 respectively,  which  were  in  effect  the last  large-scale 
attempts to mobilize new money until the desperation Mexican package 
of August 1986. The Mexican package is the main component of a sharp 310  Paul Krugman 
revival of concerted lending in  1986; the key question is whether this 
represents an aberration or the beginning of a new trend. 
Taken together, these tables  suggest the following summary of the 
effort to mobilize banks to provide new money for the debtors. First, 
even in  1983-84,  when  the  new  money  was supposed to provide  a 
major part of the solution, its supply was modest. Second, after mid- 
1984 new money from banks essentially ceased to be a recourse of the 
debtors. 
The central question regarding the behavior of the banks, then, is 
why the seemingly forceful case for defensive lending generated only 
a brief, modest injection of new money. I will consider three possible 
explanations: that the creditors became unwillingly to lend because of 
unsatisfactory  performance on the part of the debtors; that the free- 
rider problem blocked lending that was in the banks’ collective interest; 
and that the absence of new money reflected an outcome of bargaining 
in which the countries were relatively weak and the banks strong. 
7.3.2  Debtor Performance and the Supply of Funds 
The bankers themselves prefer to ascribe their limited willingness to 
lend to the failure of the countries to show adequate progress in eco- 
nomic policy.  One banker in conversation justified  a lack of funding 
on the grounds that the debtor governments were “like children”  who 
would simply waste any funds received. On this view the banks were 
in effect practicing conditionality, withholding funds contingent on re- 
forms of economic policy. 
This view raises two separate questions. First, is the indictment of 
the debtor governments correct? Second, and quite separate, is a judg- 
ment of debtor policies relevant to the explanation of limited lending? 
Do the volume and terms of lending to problem debtors depend posi- 
tively on the performance of the countries’ policymakers? 
Policies in the Debtor Countries 
The attack on the performance of the debtors faces in the first place 
the awkward fact that external adjustment, in the form of enormous 
trade surpluses, has been greater than anyone thought possible in 1983. 
This  is of  course the inevitable  counterpart of  the absence of  new 
money, but  it still means that the countries cannot be charged  with 
having failed to make any adjustment. Instead the attack focusses on 
three issues: capital flight, budgetary adjustment, and the role of the 
private sector. 
The attack on capital flight has come to assume a central place in 
the bankers’ answer to charges that they have failed to deliver on their 
part of the debt strategy. For example, de Vries writes (in World Fi- 
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Psychologically,  nothing has contributed more to the pervasive 
sense of frustration over the LDC debt problem than the realization 
that  capital  flight  persisted, if  on a  much  reduced  scale, almost 
throughout the 1983-85 period of “involuntary” lending. Creditors, 
both private and official,  are understandably reluctant to provide 
fresh funds unless the debtors put a stop to capital flight (p. 6). 
To an outsider this attack on capital flight seems oddly timed, unless 
it is viewed more as a rationalization than a real explanation. The major 
period of capital flight was during the inception of the debt crisis rather 
than  in the post-1983 period, and the structural causes of long-term 
capital  flight-overvalued  exchange rates and negative  real  interest 
rates-have  actually been reversed, with very low real exchange rates 
and very high real interest rates in major debtors. Some capital flight 
does continue, because of a lack of confidence in the debtor’s solvency. 
However, this is the same lack of confidence that prevents voluntary 
lending. There is no reason to expect domestic residents to be notice- 
ably  more willing  to invest  in  a  problem  debtor, just because they 
happen to live  there,  than foreign investors. To  demand that flight 
capital return before bank lending resumes is in effect to say that there 
will be no bank lending unless confidence is restored, i.e., that only 
voluntary lending will be provided. This ignores the whole point of the 
argument for defensive lending even when there is a perceived discount 
on claims on a country. 
The second critique of debtor policies emphasizes the failure of bud- 
getary adjustment, which manifests itself in particular in the problem 
of inflation. Here, while measurement issues can provide an endless 
source of debate, there is undoubtedly a valid point. One way to make 
this point is that the impressive external adjustment has come essen- 
tially  at the expense of a decline in investment rather than a rise in 
saving, largely because of a failure to bring budgets under control. This 
is a useful point, because it suggests a focus on the fiscal aspect of the 
debt issue, which is a useful way to cut through some otherwise prob- 
lematic issues, like the potential role of direct foreign investment and 
debt-equity swaps. 
Finally, it is argued that debtor countries have failed to make essential 
moves toward freeing up their domestic economies, both in terms of 
internal liberalization and in terms of opening the way for foreign in- 
vestment. In part this concern reflects the idea that direct foreign in- 
vestment can serve as an alternative to bank lending for financing; in 
part it is related to the proposals for debt-equity conversion. Both of 
these topics are treated below. There is also an element of supply-side 
economics, in which countries are urged to pursue more market-ori- 
ented policies in order to achieve rapid economic growth, which will 
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argument requires  a degree of certainty about the size and speed of 
the benefits of promarket policies that does not rest on hard evidence. 
It is also something new; demands for a radical shift to market-oriented 
policies were not on the table in  1983, when substantial bank lending 
was envisaged. 
On balance, there are without question serious criticisms of the eco- 
nomic policies followed in each of the debtor countries. In any case, 
one need not condemn the policies of the debtors to be disheartened 
at the results. Whether or not  one views debtor country policies  as 
having been inadequate, the performance  of the debtors has in  one 
major respect been extremely unsatisfactory. One of the key premises 
of the case for involuntary lending was that countries could increase 
their debt while reducing the ratio of debt to GDP or exports, and thus 
become more creditworthy even as they continued to borrow. As table 
7.1  makes clear,  however,  the debt ratios  have  either stagnated  or 
worsened for major debtors, in spite of their having received far less 
financing than expected. This unfavorable result is largely due to weak 
world commodity prices and limited markets for debtors’ exports, which 
have forced the trade adjustment to come primarily on the import side 
and also forced steep real  devaluations that have reduced the dollar 
value of national income. If  lenders are looking at the ratios, it is not 
surprising if they have become discouraged and are less willing to lend 
now than they were in  1983. 
Although the debtors have thus dissatisfied their creditors with both 
their  policies  and their performance, it is questionable whether this 
dissatisfaction is the source of the unwillingness to lend. An alternative 
view dismisses complaints about the debtors’ performance as ration- 
alizations for the lack of bank financing, not its cause. 
The Irrelevance of Debtor Policies 
The basic point of this alternative view is that to advance the policy 
problems of debtors as an explanation of the absence of bank lending 
is  to confuse defensive  lending with free-market transactions. For a 
country that is borrowing from voluntary lenders on the open market, 
the ability to borrow does indeed depend on confidence in the country’s 
management and prospects. When this confidence is lost, the country 
becomes a  problem  debtor.  Once  problem  debtor status  has  been 
achieved, however, the new money provided through concerted action 
is not governed by the same motives.  Provided that they are able to 
act cooperatively, creditors will lend as much as they have to in order 
to protect their investment, not as much as the country has earned or 
as much as it can be expected to service. It is by no means clear that 
good behavior will earn a country the right to more capital. If anything, 
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weaken a country’s bargaining position and lead to a reduction of the 
supply of new money and a worsening of its terms. 
A perverse relationship between behavior and the terms of lending 
is apparent in recent events. Argentina and Mexico, both demanding 
and receiving new money, have been able to reschedule debt at 13/16 
percent  over LIBOR (the London interbank offer rate for dollar de- 
posits). The Philippines, rescheduling without asking for new money, 
had  to pay  slightly  more at 718  percent. Columbia, which  has never 
needed to reschedule, recently paid  1 118  percent on a new loan (see 
The Economist, 25 April  1987, 77-78). 
A perverse relationship between performance and the supply of new 
money can be seen in the case of Mexico. When Mexico was apparently 
able to run massive trade surpluses while resuming modest growth, it 
received no new money. When oil prices collapsed,  the first new-money 
package in more than two years was negotiated. 
The reason for pointing out these perversities is not to condemn the 
banks, or to suggest that their behavior is irrational.  It is instead to 
emphasize that defensive lending is not the same thing as free-market 
lending. It is determined by what the traffic will bear, that is, by what 
is necessary to safeguard existing claims. If defensive lending falls off 
it is because the need for it, as perceived by the creditors, has declined. 
This means that the criticisms of debtor policies that have been offered 
to justify the lack of new money should be viewed as rationalizations 
rather than reasons. The question we need to answer is, why were the 
creditors able to get by with providing as little new money as they did? 
7.3.3  The Free-Rider Problem 
One prospect that raised fears in the early stages of the debt problem 
was that defensive  lending by  creditors would  be paralyzed  by  the 
problem  of getting collective action, especially by  smaller banks. A 
possible interpretation of the stalling of lending to problem debtors is 
that the free-rider problem did in fact do  just that. How much evidence 
is there for the free-rider problem’s importance? 
Data on U.S. banks does show evidence of a free-rider problem, 
albeit with  some puzzles  (table 7.4).  The small regional  banks have 
consistently  either reduced their LDC exposure more or expanded it 
less than either the money  center banks or the middle-sized banks. 
After 1983, the middle-sized banks have in turn consistently increased 
exposure less than the money center banks. (Somewhat puzzlingly, in 
1982 and 1983 the money center banks accepted smaller exposure growth 
than the middle-sized banks.) Thus the burden has been borne dispro- 
portionately by the larger banks. 
The real question, however, is how important the free-rider problem 
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at answering this question, the last two lines of table 7.4 compare the 
actual growth rate of debt with the rate that would have obtained if 
middle-sized and regional banks had in fact been willing to expand their 
exposure as much as the large banks. In this hypothetical case exposure 
would have grown more rapidly in 1984, and fallen less rapidly in 1985 
and 1986, but the basic qualitative fact of a near-stagnation  in  bank 
exposure would not have been altered. This reflects both the high initial 
concentration of claims in the hands of the larger banks and the fact 
that the withdrawal of smaller banks was a matter of gradual reductions 
in exposure rather than wholesale flight. 
Now one might  argue that had  there been  more cooperation from 
smaller banks the money center banks would have been willing to lend 
more themselves. The theoretical possibility that was raised in the first 
section of this paper was that the presence of a noncooperating fringe 
might make the whole enterprise of defensive lending unworthwhile 
from the point of view of the core of collusive creditors. However, this 
seems unlikely as an explanation  of what happened in  1984-85.  The 
nine largest banks hold about 60 percent of the total U.S.  bank claims 
on problem debtors. Thus in terms of the criterion for justifiable de- 
fensive lending, f is about 0.6. It is hard to believe that the case for 
defensive lending rested on such a knife-edge that a 40 percent non- 
cooperative fringe made the difference (although if  European and Jap- 
anese banks are also counted as free riders, the accounting changes 
dramatically). And as long as defensive lending remains worthwhile, 
free-riding should lead tofaster, not slower growth in the exposure of 
the core banks. 
One might also argue that the effect of the attempt to free ride by 
regionals is reflected not so much in their eventual exposure as in the 
delay they impose on the process. The recent Mexican new-money 
Table 7.4  Changes in Claims on Debtors (percent) 
1982  I983  1984  1985  1986" 
All capital importers 
Money center  8.7  3.6  -  0.8  -7.1  -  10.1 
Medium-sized  11.4  8.1  0.9  -  15.1  -21.5 
Regionals  5.4  0.8  -7.7  -  2.4  -  11.6 
Latin America 
Money center  8.5  2.1  4.7  -  2.1  -4.8 
Medium-sized  12.1  7.3  -0.6  -  13.0  -  13.5 
Regionals  4.2  -  1.4  -  3.0  -  2.5  -  10.0 
Total  8.2  2.3  1.9  -4.5  -7.5 
Hypothetical  5.9  1.8  4.0  -  2.5  -4.0 
Sources: See table 7.2; and author's calculations. 
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package  was held  up for eight  months because of the difficulties of 
getting the smaller banks on board. As we saw above, however, the 
cessation of  capital flows to debtors after mid-1984 reflected an absence 
of  new-money packages, not delays in approval and implementation 
of packages already negotiated. 
The free-rider problem is a real issue, and may have contributed to 
the toughness of the stance of the large banks in negotiating a bargain 
with the debtors. However, the best explanation of the failure of the 
banks to lend is that this represented a collectively rational decision 
on their part: They lent as little as they did because they did not, as 
it turned out, need to lend more. This leads us to the third explanation 
of the lending shortfall, which locates its cause in the relative bargaining 
power of the creditors and the debtors. 
7.3.4  Bargaining Power 
The third, and I believe most persuasive, explanation for the stall in 
bank lending to problem debtors is that the banks did not lend because 
they did not have to: They found themselves in a strong enough bar- 
gaining position to extract full  interest  from the countries without a 
quid  pro quo of new money.  Defensive  lending failed  to take place 
because it was unnecessary. The corollary to this view is that the failure 
of the banks to come up with new money in 1984-86  does not show 
that they can never be induced to do so; the banks did not fail to act 
in their own interest. 
The principal evidence for the view that banks were simply striking 
a hard bargain with the debtors is negative. There is no indication that 
banks were disappointed  in the performance of debtors in  1984-85, 
leading to unwillingness to lend (and in any case we have already argued 
that there is if  anything a perverse connection between performance 
and defensive lending). There were no cases of new-money packages 
scuttled by attempts of small banks to free ride. Most important, until 
1986 there was no indication that the failure to provide  new money 
was pushing countries to the edge of refusal to pay interest. 
In a sense the question should be put the other way. It is not very 
puzzling that banks lent so little, since they seem to have judged cor- 
rectly that they could do so without adverse consequences. The ques- 
tion is why the countries were so willing to acquiesce. This remains 
somewhat hard to understand; even  The Economist confesses itself 
“baffled by the good behavior of the Brazilians and other debtor coun- 
tries up to now.”  In the jargon of bargaining theory, it is hard to un- 
derstand why the threat points of the debtor countries were set so low, 
or perhaps why the threat points of the banks were set so high. What 
were the threatened sanctions that made countries willing to service 
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Bankers and theoretical  analysts have both emphasized the impor- 
tance of good behavior to future access to capital markets (Eaton and 
Gersovitz 1981). However, the prospects for a return to sustantial net 
inward resource transfer for the major debtors are distant at best.  It 
would require a very low discount rate for Mexico or Brazil to regard 
it as worthwhile to make current resource transfers of 4-5 percent of 
GDP now in order to have a chance at receiving inward transfers of a 
few percent of GDP sometime in the next decade. There is also con- 
siderable  question how  much  current bad  behavior threatens future 
access to capital markets in any case (Kaletsky 1985). 
An alternative possibility is that the debtor countries fear retaliation 
by creditors that would interfere with their trade. Such worries were 
widely expressed in 1982 and 1983, when it was argued that if a country 
were to default openly, the efforts of bankers to seize whatever they 
could would cut off not only trade credit but bank accounts, and even 
lead to seizure of cargoes in port. However, the experience since then 
has muted such images. At present eight Latin American countries are 
failing to service their debt; the consequences to their trade have not 
been readily  apparent. Admittedly there may be longer-term damage 
because of the loss of reputation, but these costs are certainly diffuse. 
Also, it is possible to argue that banks have been reticent in invoking 
sanctions against small countries that are in extremely serious trouble, 
and that a major or more healthy debtor would finally feel the adverse 
effects of failing to behave properly. However, as time goes by in the 
Brazilian  impasse without dramatic penalties this suggestion also be- 
comes less plausible. 
One point that may help explain the quiescence of the countries is 
the cynical  but  apparently valid  political  observation that only  the 
recent rate of change of the economic situtation, not the level, matters 
for political purposes. By this criterion the debtors were, in  1984 and 
1985, doing acceptably well; although their incomes had taken a severe 
beating in  1981-83,  in  1984-85  Mexico achieved modest growth and 
Brazil rapid growth, despite the need to run very large trade surpluses. 
Again, impressionistically it seems that the countries felt that they were 
doing well enough to be unwilling to press their case with the bankers 
and set in motion unknown risks. 
Finally, an important element in debtors’ willingness to accept an 
unfavorable  bargain  has  probably  been  the political  pressure  from 
creditor-country governments, especially the United States, carrying 
the implicit message that sanctions of nonfinancial kind will be imposed 
on debtors that fail to service their debt. These sanctions could include 
trade action, immigration policy, and changes in U.S.  attitudes toward 
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tually use their powers to enforce penalties on Third World debtors is 
doubtful, but the belief that they might is an important element in the 
thinking of the debtors. As Dornbusch (1987) puts it, “the governments 
of the major industrialized countries have insisted on debt service and 
have managed a system of debt collection. . . [enforcing] the debts by 
behind-the-scenes political pressure.” 
7.3.5  Implications 
The failure of the commercial banks to provide new money on the 
scale envisaged in  1983 has been seen by many observers, including 
myself,  as a sign of  the unworkability  of the strategy of  relying  on 
concerted lending by existing creditors. That is, it has been viewed as 
showing that banks cannot be mobilized  to provide new money,  as 
proposed in such plans as the Banker initiative, even if  the provision 
of new money is in their own interest. 
This interpretation would be correct if  the lack of new money es- 
sentially reflected an inability of the creditors to undertake collective 
action. The discussion here suggests, however, that this was not the 
case; that creditors were acting in a collectively rational fashion, and 
they lent so little because that was the strategy that made sense in their 
own interest. If this alternative explanation is correct, then a change 
in the situation can lead to a very different response from the banks. 
If the countries become tougher bargainers, or the banks less tough, 
than  bank  lending  can  still  be  provided,  as the  Mexican  package 
illustrates. 
This interpretation raises two questions: What would make the sit- 
uation  change, and how  would  the change take place? That is, will 
there be an extended period of debt moratoria, etc.? We return to these 
questions in the final section of the paper, but first it is necessary to 
examine the possibility that alternative sources of financing could ob- 
viate the need for bank financing. 
7.4  Alternatives to Bank Financing 
A number of analysts have suggested that the answer to the debt 
problem lies to a significant degree in encouraging other forms of capital 
inflow  to substitute for bank  financing.  In particular,  direct foreign 
investment would be a non-debt-creating flow that would decrease the 
“leveraging”  of debtor countries, and potentially improve their situ- 
ation. Recently debt-equity swaps have attracted much favorable at- 
tention  as ways of making the contribution of direct investment not 
simply incremental but an immediate substitution for part of existing 
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To assess the prospects for such alternatives to bank financing, it is 
necessary to start by asking more carefully  than most analysts have 
exactly how  new  nondebt capital inflows help the debt problem-a 
subject that is more subtle than one might at first expect. Then we can 
turn to the prospects for increased direct foreign investment, and finally 
to the potential for productive debt conversion schemes. 
7.4.1 
Do nondebt capital inflows help a debtor country? It may seem odd 
to pose  the question, since they  of course reduce the size of trade 
surplus needed to service the debt. However, asking this question does 
force us to focus more clearly on the nature of  the problem and the 
limits to what magic wands such as changes in the form of liabilities 
can do to resolve it. 
The key point to be made is that the problem of a debtor country is 
not  simply one of running a  sufficient trade surplus to raise foreign 
exchange to service its external debt. In much discussion of the debt 
problem the fiction is adopted that the debtor country is a single unit, 
virtually a single individual, so that the debtor’s problem is wholly one 
of dealing with  external creditors-that  is, it is purely  aforeign  ex- 
change problem. This is a useful fiction for many purposes. However, 
when we get down to the level of proposing solutions it is essential to 
recognize that the debt problem is in the first instance a problem of 
debtor governments. That is, in addition to being a foreign exchange 
problem it is also, and perhaps even primarily,  a more general fiscal 
problem. Most though not all of the debt problem is the problem that 
governments have in servicing their debt and the debt that they have 
guaranteed, both foreign and domestic. 
Suppose that a debtor country succeeds in attracting a new flow of 
direct foreign investment. This clearly helps the foreign exchange prob- 
lem. However, it does not  make any direct contribution to the gov- 
ernment’s fiscal problem, except to the extent that over time the direct 
foreign investment  may induce economic growth that raises  the tax 
base. The only immediate favorable effect of direct foreign investment 
on the debtor’s financial position is the extent to which it allows the 
government to issue  more domestic  debt with  which  to  service its 
foreign debt. 
Consider what happens to the consolidated accounts of a government 
and a central bank when a foreign firm makes a direct investment. The 
firm uses foreign currency to purchase domestic currency, with which 
it makes its investment. The central bank therefore sells domestic cur- 
rency and acquires assets in the form of foreign exchange. However, 
the domestic currency that has been issued adds to the money supply, 
and may therefore have an inflationary  impact. To  sterilize the effect 
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the government would have to withdraw the money through an issue 
of domestic debt. If  it does this, the net effect on the balance  sheet 
has been to swap an increase in domestic debt for an increase in foreign 
assets; the net debt position of the government has not changed. 
Now  it is possible and likely  that the change in the government’s 
portfolio will increase its freedom of action. To the extent that money 
issue has been constrained by defense of the exchange rate the increase 
in foreign assets will allow greater monetization of debt, in turn allowing 
lower real interest rates and higher investment. Alternatively, the avail- 
ability of foreign exchange may allow the government to relax exchange 
controls, with beneficial results for economic growth. These are real 
benefits, but they hinge essentially on the proposition that for a problem 
debtor the shadow price on foreign exchange is less than the price the 
investor pays for it. This wedge provides the scope for gains from non- 
debt-creating capital flows, but these flows do not provide a panacea 
for the fiscal aspect of the debt problem.  The point is that a million 
dollars invested in a new electronics plant in Mexico is not a perfect 
substitute for a million dollars worth of debt relief. 
Thus even if  the prospects for new capital flows other than bank 
credit are highly favorable, they provide at best an answer to only part 
of the problem. Nonetheless, we need to ask how favorable the pros- 
pects are. 
7.4.2  Prospects for Direct Foreign Investment 
Direct foreign investment occurs when foreign investors make two 
choices: to invest, and  to finance  by  equity  rather than debt. The 
prospects for attracting new flows of this kind depend on the incentives 
for both actions. 
The prima  facie  case for foreign  firms  to  increase investment in 
problem debtors is not strong. After all, actual investment in the debtors 
has fallen substantially, suggesting that local firms have not found it 
profitable. To suggest that there is an incentive for inward investment, 
one must argue for a difference in the incentives  facing potential foreign 
investors and local firms. 
One possible source of such a difference is capital costs. Real interest 
rates in  the debtors have been very high, possibly reflecting the de- 
mands of the government on national saving with external financing 
cut off.  For foreign investors who have a lower cost of capital, in- 
vestment might still be profitable. It is possible to argue that rates of 
return on investment in the debtors are actually quite high; while pro- 
tected import-substitution industries are depressed by the recessions 
in  most debtors, the substantial real  depreciations in  many  debtors 
since the onset of the crisis (table 7.5) have presumably made new 
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Table 7.5  Real Exchange Rates, April 1987 (1980-82  = 100) 
Argentina  53.3 
Brazil  74.4 
Mexico  62.9 
Korea  12.5 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust (1987). 
On this argument, then, profitability of potential new investments has 
not declined; the fall-off in investment reflects instead a rise in the price 
of capital that does not apply to foreign firms. If  firms had access to 
capital at world prices, the demand for investment would be sufficient 
to return debtors to their normal status of capital importers rather than 
exporters. 
This argument raises the question, however, of why the high rates 
of return on financial instruments in debtor nations have not themselves 
attracted portfolio investment. The answer is presumably that the pros- 
pect of being able to realize these returns is less than certain; that the 
possibility of foreign exchange controls, inflation, or  failure to pay fully 
on domestic debt is high enough to offset the seemingly high real in- 
terest rates in the eyes of international investors. But then the question 
is  whether the  same does not  apply  to the returns on investing  in 
physical capital as well. Japanese residents are not buying  Mexican 
Treasury bills, despite their high returns, because the risks outweigh 
the returns. Why does the same not hold true for Japanese investment 
in Mexican electronics plants? 
Of course to date the answer has been precisely that foreign investors 
have regarded physical claims as risky, too. Despite the real deprecia- 
tions  there has  not  been  a  rush  by  foreign firms to manufacture in 
problem  debtors. Hopes of  inducing direct foreign  investment on a 
substantial  scale rest on the belief  that investors can be induced  to 
expect their claims to be treated differently  from bank debt. Such a 
belief  is  not  impossible  to justify.  Direct  foreign investment (DFI), 
which makes a direct contribution to the economy and generates foreign 
investment income over a longer time horizon than debt service, could 
well receive more favorable treatment than debt, especially government 
debt. Furthermore, in the past DFI has been regarded with suspicion 
because of the perceived threat to national sovereignty, and it has been 
limited by restrictions. To the extent that debtor governments can cred- 
ibly remove these restrictions, they may be able to induce new flows. 
The major limitation on direct foreign investment for problem debtors 
is that foreign investors are potential victims of the fiscal problems that 
direct investment does little to resolve. As long as the expected ability 
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(1986) points out, an unallocated loss that may be expected to fall in 
part on owners of physical capital as well as on holders of debt. Unless 
this  is  resolved,  the prospects  for attracting large  inward  DFI  are 
doubtful. 
7.4.3  Debt Conversion Schemes 
Financial industry experts have strongly pressed for the conversion 
of  external debt into equity claims. Advocates of these swaps at first 
seemed to be  claiming that  such conversions  would  simultaneously 
reduce countries’ external obligations and generate an inflow of direct 
foreign investment (see, for example, Morgan Guaranty Trust 1986). 
Some cooling of enthusiasm has occurred as careful analysis has shown 
that a debt-equity conversion in fact does neither. The advantages of 
debt-equity swaps are in fact fairly subtle, and there are potentially 
serious disadvantages. 
Debt-equity swaps are actually part of a broader array of debt con- 
version  schemes. The general characteristic of  such schemes is that 
investors who have acquired some of  a country’s external debt at a 
discount on the secondary market are permitted to redeem the debt 
for some kind of  domestic asset. In the largest program of  debt con- 
version to date, that in  Chile, more than half of the debt conversion 
has actually taken the form of sales of debt to the debtors, without any 
requirement that the proceeds be invested in equity (see Larrain 1986). 
Investments made by means of  debt conversion schemes in no case 
contribute  to  net  capital  inflow; the  whole point  is  that  they  allow 
investors to acquire claims on a country through a transaction with the 
country’s creditors rather than its residents. The potential benefits lie 
instead in  the future effect on a country’s stream of  net  investment 
income. First, debt, which carries with it an obligation to make a flat 
stream of  nominal payments over time, may be replaced with other 
liabilities whose payment stream rises over time with growth and in- 
flation. This serves the same aim of shifting the time profile of payments 
that defensive lending was supposed to accomplish. Second, in some 
circumstances debt conversion may serve as a back-door route to debt 
forgiveness; investors may be induced to acquire assets with an ex- 
pected present value less than the face value of the converted debt. 
Against these potential benefits must be set two possible costs. First 
is that a debt conversion scheme may divert capital inflow that would 
otherwise have taken place through other channels; since at best debt 
conversion makes no contribution to net capital inflow, any such di- 
version represents a net capital outflow. Second is the possibility that 
debt conversion schemes will have an adverse fiscal impact. 
Although many debt conversion schemes are possible, the essential 
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distinctions. On one side is the distinction between debt-equity swaps, 
in which debt must be converted into equity and held in that form, and 
“debt-peso”  swaps in  which  debt is  converted into cash without  a 
restriction  on how that cash is to be invested (in the most significant 
program of debt conversion to date, that of Chile, this distinction cor- 
responds to the distinction between chapter 19 and chapter 18 trans- 
actions respectively). On  the  other side  is  the  distinction  between 
conversions involving private debt, which have no fiscal impact, and 
those involving public or public-guaranteed debt. 
1. Conversions ofprivate debt to equity: The most favorable kind of 
debt conversion is one in which the debt of private firms is exchanged 
for equity (not necessarily of the same firms). Since dividends can be 
expected to rise over time with  inflation and economic growth, this 
serves the desirable aim of tilting the time profile of a country’s pay- 
ments to foreign creditors in  the direction  of  the time  profile  of  its 
ability to pay. A secondary advantage is that to the extent that earnings 
on equity are related to the economic state of the country, this con- 
version shifts the country to a more equitable sharing of risk. 
Even this  most favorable  form of  debt conversion, however, can 
aggravate a country’s foreign exchange constraint in the short run. To 
the extent that a purchase of equity through debt conversion substitutes 
for a purchase that would have taken place in any case-that  is, to the 
extent that there is anything less than 100 percent additionality-the 
conversion reduces net capital inflows. One way to look at this is to 
say that a debt conversion that substitutes for capital inflows takes 
rescheduled debt-that  is, debt that has been frozen into long-term 
claims-and  de facto unfreezes it into short-term claims, undermining 
the purpose of the rescheduling. Since some substitution of debt-equity 
swaps for capital inflows is surely unavoidable, even this best case of 
debt conversion represents a trade-off of  a worsened capital account 
now for a more favorable investment income profile in the future. 
2. Conversions of  private debt to cash: A sale of external debt back 
to the creditor, without a requirement that the proceeds be invested in 
equity, differs from a debt-equity swap both in being less likely to have 
favorable effects on the profile of future investment payments, and in 
running greater risks of worsening the capital account in the short run. 
The best case of a “debt-peso” swap  would be one in which domestic 
residents  are induced  to repatriate external assets that they  would 
otherwise have retained outside the country. The initial capital account 
impact of this transaction would be zero. Future payments of interest 
and principal would be reduced. However, because the owners of the 
repatriated capital  would  presumably  invest the funds domestically, 
they would in future substitute the income from these investments for 
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source transfers that the country must make to the rest of the world 
is uncertain; it depends on the planned domestic consumption of  the 
investors. 
The concern with debt conversations not tied to equity investment 
is that they offer greater opportunity than debt-equity swaps for actions 
that worsen the capital account. Most extreme would be the case where 
debt is converted into domestic currency, and this currency is then 
converted (legally or illegally) into foreign exchange and exported again. 
Such “round-tripping”  would turn debt conversions into a device for 
facilitating capital flight. Less dramatically but equally harmful in its 
effect on the capital account is the use of  debt conversions as a sub- 
stitute channel for repatriation of earnings on overseas assets; the effect 
of this substitution is to reduce net capital inflows one-for-one. 
The main justification that one might offer for unrestricted conver- 
sions of  debt is that they may  serve as an indirect way for a country 
to buy back its own debt at a discount; more on this below. 
3. Conversion of  public  debt: Conversion of  public debt, whether 
into equity or unrestricted, has the same effects as conversion of private 
debt, with an additional fiscal impact. 
The conversion of  external public debt into local currency, if  not 
sterilized, will  be inflationary. Thus it must be offset by  an issue of 
domestic debt, which turns it from the point of view of the government 
into a swap of  foreign for local currency debt. From a fiscal point of 
view, this  is  a definite disadvantage. The reason is that in  problem 
debtors real interest rates on internal debt are far higher than on ex- 
ternal. This in turn reflects the fact that the credibility of government 
promises to repay, both internal and external, is uncertain. In the case 
of external debt, however, rescheduling agreements have frozen cred- 
itors into holding claims at an interest rate well below what they would 
require to hold those claims voluntarily. A debt conversion unfreezes 
these claims and converts them into new, short-term claims on which 
the government must pay a high enough interest rate to compensate 
for risk of nonpayment. Thus a debt conversion involving public debt, 
even if it is structured so as not to worsen the capital account, trades 
off the benefit of an improved composition of external liabilities for the 
cost of  a worsened fiscal situation. 
This review of  the effects of  debt conversions does not convey a 
favorable impression. However, there is one other potential advantage 
of debt conversions that may be an important motivation: They offer 
an end run around some of the legal and institutional obstacles to debt 
forgiveness. Given the substantial discounts on secondary market sales 
of problem debtors’ obligations, some governments may regard it as a 
worthwhile investment to buy back their own national debt. However, 
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parties to buy the debt, and then collecting some fee for the process, 
governments can achieve approximately the same result. Thus Chile 
has auctioned off rights to “debt-peso” conversions (though not debt- 
equity swaps), which in effect allows the government to buy back the 
debt at a discount equal to the auction premium. Other countries may 
achieve the same aim by specifying a different exchange rate for debt 
conversions than for other transactions. 
At least so far, however, the debt forgiveness aspect has been limited. 
In the Chilean case the auction prices on debt-peso conversions have 
been much smaller than the secondary market discounts, presumably 
reflecting the fact that within Chile, with  capital exports controlled, 
the shadow price of foreign exchange is higher than its official price. 
And debt-equity swaps are not auctioned off. 
In summary, the idea of  using debt-equity  conversion as an alter- 
native to defensive lending has been heavily  oversold. Such conver- 
sions not only cannot eliminate the need for debt-creating capital inflows, 
they may easily increase rather than decrease the necessity  for new 
borrowing. 
7.5  “Financing” through Debt Forgiveness 
Through most of this paper attention is focussed on the possibility 
of reducing the resource transfer burden through new capital inflows. 
However, an obvious alternative is to deal with the problems posed 
by an overhang of debt through an agreement by creditors to accept 
less repayment than originally specified in the loan contracts. That is, 
debt forgiveness is an alternative to financing. While debt relief  pro- 
posals are dealt with in detail elsewhere in this volume, it is inevitable 
that the subject be tackled in this chapter, too. Three questions arise: 
First, what are the advantages of forgiving rather than financing a debt 
overhang? Second, what are the offsetting advantages of relying  on 
new capital flows? Third, what operational difficulties might interfere 
with desirable programs of debt forgiveness? 
7.5.1  Advantages of Debt Forgiveness 
Debt forgiveness obviously offers a benefit to the country forgiven. 
However, proponents of debt forgiveness are not  usually simply ad- 
vocating a neutral redistribution of world wealth; they argue that debt 
forgiveness is in the interest of the creditors as well, or at least would 
raise world  income as a whole. The usual reason given is the simple 
macroeconomic linkage: With the debt burden reduced, debtors would 
import more and thus stimulate world output. Except in the very short 
run, however, and maybe even then, output in the industrial countries 
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to generate aggregate demand. The economic advantages of debt relief 
lie not in demand creation, but in eliminating the distortions of incen- 
tives generated by the overhang of problem debt. 
One such distortion has already been mentioned, in the context of 
the bargaining game between debtors and creditors. As we noted, prob- 
lem debtors and their creditors can be viewed as bargaining over the 
rate of resource transfer; in an effort to demonstrate their bargaining 
toughness, they may be led into actions that temporarily disrupt trade 
and financial markets, imposing costs on the world economy. One way 
to say this is to observe that as long as the debt remains too large to 
allow  a  return to normal  debt service, the debt crisis  remains at a 
continual simmer that must be expected occasionally to boil over. When 
this happens, the distributional struggle between debtors and creditors 
reduces the size of the overall pie. If it were possible by a program of 
debt forgiveness to reduce the remaining debt to a level that eliminated 
the need for this bargaining game, these costs could be avoided. This 
would represent a gain for the world economy as a whole, though it 
might still represent a loss from the point of view of the creditors. 
A second distortion has been pointed out by Sachs (1986), and arises 
from the preverse relation between behavior and treatment of problem 
debtors. For a country that is engaged in a bargaining  situation with 
its creditors, an enhancement of its economic situation will  normally 
be  reflected  in  a  reduction  in  the  inflow  of  new  capital, i.e., in  an 
increase in the rate of resource transfer necessary, and to a worsening 
of the terms on which that capital is made available. This amounts to 
a tax on the country’s efforts to adjust its economy. Policies that expand 
export capacity,  substitute for imports, increase an economy’s flexi- 
bility,  etc., typically  are costly for governments to undertake, either 
because they  require  diversion  of  scarce resources or because they 
require challenging vested political interests. If the countries know that 
the net effect of such policies will largely be to benefit their creditors 
rather than themselves, the incentive to take desirable steps will  be 
reduced. 
Again, a program of debt relief that settles the issue once and for all 
can in principle eliminate this distortion. If debt is reduced to a level 
that countries expect to pay, any marginal improvement in a country’s 
prospects once again accrues to the country rather than its creditors. 
Thus a successful once-and-for-all debt forgiveness would restore nor- 
mal incentives, where a continuation  of ad hoc financing that results 
from bargaining provides perverse incentives. 
The combined advantages of avoiding costly future confrontations 
between creditors and debtors and eliminating the perverse incentives 
that a regime of involuntary lending gives to the debtors suggest that 
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raise world income. Against these advantages, however,  must be set 
the disadvantages, both those for the world as a whole and those for 
the creditors. 
7.5.2  Disadvantages of Debt Forgiveness 
From the point of view of the world as  a whole, the main disadvantage 
of debt forgiveness is the moral hazard problem: If countries that ran 
up excessive debt levels in the past are able to get the debt forgiven, 
it will distort incentives in the future. 
The nature of  the distortion would  depend on how debt relief  is 
financed. If  the debt relief  were to come at the expense of  creditor 
governments rather than private banks, the effect might be to encourage 
both irresponsible  lending and irresponsible borrowing,  as countries 
and banks conclude that OECD governments will bail them out in future 
crises. If (as is more plausible) the relief comes largely at the expense 
of the private creditors, lending will be constrained in the future, pre- 
sumably to excessively low levels. However, though their borrowing 
would be constrained, countries might be tempted to behave irrespon- 
sibly in other ways. For example, countries that now have manageable 
levels of debt might be tempted to pursue policies that threaten their 
ability to service the debt, in the anticipation that if that should happen 
the debt would be forgiven. For that matter, debtors that received debt 
forgiveness once might be tempted to pursue policies that required a 
second round of forgiveness. 
How important is this moral hazard  issue? There is essentially no 
evidence that would let us evaluate it quantitatively.  I  would offer a 
purely intuitive guess that it is not, in the present case, very important. 
The ebt crisis of  1982 was a sufficiently unique event, both in terms 
of its global  extent and in  terms of  the severe external shocks that 
debtor nations experienced, that debt forgiveness in this case would 
probably  not be construed as setting a precedent for future debt ne- 
gotiations. Also, if debt forgiveness can be negotiated at all, it will be 
such a difficult process that it will  hardly facilitate further rounds of 
forgiveness. However, this is purely ajudgement call. The moral hazard 
argument does make a global argument against debt forgiveness. 
Probably a more relevant argument against debt forgiveness in prac- 
tice  is  the  fact that  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  creditors debt 
forgiveness now may reduce the expected value of their claims more 
than financing a debt overhang for the time being, even if they do not 
ever expect to be paid in full. The reason is that preserving the nominal 
debt on a country at its full value, even when it is subjectively viewed 
as being worth much less than this, gives creditors the opportunity 
to benefit from unexpected good fortune. Suppose that there are two 
possibilities: a country might in one state of the world be expected to 327  Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors 
repay  75 percent of its debt, in the other 25 percent. If  these states 
are equally  likely, debt  would  be  valued at 50  percent  of  par.  One 
might suppose that it would make sense to recognize the reality that 
the debt  will not be fully repaid,  and forgive the 50 percent  of  the 
debt that has already been discounted by the market. Yet  to do this 
would prevent the creditors from collecting all 75 percent in the fa- 
vorable  state: The option value of  the large nominal debt will have 
been sacrificed, and the reduced claims would be valued at only 37.5 
percent of the original par. 
The risks of future confrontation and the perverse incentive effects 
of a debt overhang work against the advantages of  keeping nominal 
debt large, even for the creditors; they face a trade-off between the 
option value of financing without forgiveness and the incentive effects 
of forgiving rather than financing. Because they care about the distri- 
butional aspects, however, creditors can be expected to prefer a so- 
lution that involves less debt forgiveness than would be advocated by 
someone trying to maximize world income. 
7.5.3  Operational Problems with Debt Forgiveness 
Even if  there should be a consensus that debt relief is desirable, it 
would be very difficult to put into practice. It might seem that the fact 
that debt is already discounted substantially on the market should offer 
possibilities for clever schemes to convert this discount into a reduction 
in countries’ obligations. However, there are serious collective action 
and externality problems  that block unilateral  action on the part of 
both individual creditors and the debtors themselves. 
Suppose first that creditors decide that it would actually be in their 
interests to offer a reduction in the obligations of a problem debtor. It 
is  still not  in  the interest  of  an individual  creditor  to forgive debt, 
because this would simply reduce his own share of  the claims while 
enhancing the value of other claims. Thus there may be a “prisoner’s 
dilemma” in which it is in the collective interest of creditors to forgive 
part of the debt but no individual creditor has an incentive to act. 
Suppose on the other hand that a debtor nation tries to take advantage 
of the secondary market to buy back some of its own debt at a discount 
(and we suppose that the legal obstacles are somehow waived). The 
problem in  this case is that in the way the bargaining game that we 
have seen characterizes relationships  between a problem debtor and 
its  creditors, such a reduction in  nominal debt outstanding will  not 
reduce the country’s expected future payments one for one. By  re- 
ducing the outstanding debt, the country will have improved its objec- 
tive position, and therefore weakened its bargaining strength vis-a-vis 
the remaining creditors. Conceivably a buyback of debt would serve 
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to the country at all.  For example, suppose that a country has $10 
billion of debt, but everyone knows that it can pay only $5 billion. If 
it buys back $1 billion of debt at 50 percent of par, it will have a nominal 
debt of only $9 billion remaining, but it will still be expected to pay $5 
billion, and the buyback will have accomplished nothing from the coun- 
try’s point of view. 
These problems  mean  that even if  all  parties agree that debt for- 
giveness in desirable, it cannot be achieved in a piecemeal fashion. A 
negotiation in  which  all or virtually all debt obligations are simulta- 
neously reduced would be necessary. Such a negotiation could be forced 
by unilateral action by a debtor country; otherwise it would require a 
coordinating and mediating role by third parties, such as international 
organizations.  At the present time there seems to be little inclination 
on the part of the major debtors to press for a once-and-for-all package 
of debt forgiveness, and even less inclination on the part of international 
organizations to take the lead in organizing such packages. That may 
change, but for the time  being forgiveness  does not  seem about to 
displace financing as the key concern in the debt problem. 
7.6  Outlook for Capital Flows 
Direct foreign investment cannot be counted on to provide  the fi- 
nancing that banks have failed to provide, and schemes like debt-equity 
swaps are much more problematic than their sponsors seem to have 
appreciated. The desirability of debt relief is still controversial, and in 
any case it poses operational difficulties that none of the actors in the 
debt situation seem at this point ready to take the lead in resolving. 
Thus the central  question regarding financing for problem debtors is 
whether involuntary lending by banks can be restarted. This depends 
crucially on the interpretation of the problems with mobilizing lending 
so far.  If  the cessation of lending during  1984-86  really reflected  an 
inability of the banks to act in their own interests, prospects are bleak. 
If it represented collectively rational behavior on the part of the banks, 
then the limits on bank lending tell  us only that the banks chose not 
to, not that they will not. 
The argument made here is that the evidence is most consistent with 
the view that low bank lending was the outcome of a bargaining process 
in which, for a variety of reasons, creditors had very high bargaining 
power compared with debtors. A shift in that bargaining process will 
produce a different result. Specifically, the bargain will shift if  debtor 
countries come to realize that a return to normal market access is not 
imminent, that the internal political costs of continuing full debt service 
are high, that the external cost from a failure to reach agreement with 
the banks is low, and, perhaps, that the U.S. government will not take 329  Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors 
political revenge on deadbeats. Given a situation of this kind, creditors 
will prefer to negotiate some combination of de facto capitalization of 
interest and reduced rates rather than fail to reach any agreement. 
What about the possibility of debt moratoria and sanctions against 
the debtors? If  all parties were fully informed about each others’ mo- 
tives  and  opportunities, we  would expect everyone  immediately  to 
reach a bargain that reflected the ability of the players to mete out and 
receive punishment, without any necessity for the actions actually to 
take place. However, given the uncertainty involved, it will probably 
be necessary for players to demonstrate their resolve by announcing 
debt moratoria, seizing assets, and so on. Ideally third parties would 
be able to mediate and avoid such open confrontations, which have 
real costs, although less than is often supposed. However, the impor- 
tant point if confrontations cannot be avoided-which  will  sometimes 
be the case-is  to realize that periods in which debtors and creditors 
fail to reach agreement are a part of the game, not the end of it. 
Thus the outlook, if  this analysis is correct, is in fact for a revival 
of  bank financing to the debtors. This financing may for a while take 
the form of arrearages, until the debtors and creditors reach agreement. 
Eventually it will be formalized in a new agreement. There will be new 
bank lending because the countries will need it: The moral of this paper 
is that the supply of capital to problem debtors is, in the end, driven 
by the demand. 
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